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1. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
2. See Ala. State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945) (“The
requirements for a justiciable case or controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment
proceeding than in any other type of suit.”).
3. See Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-41 (1937).
4. See 22A AM. JUR. 2D Declaratory Judgments § 21 (2003).
5. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
6. See Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d 631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
7. Id.
357
Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp.: A New Standard for Tenth
Circuit Declaratory Judgment Jurisdiction in Intellectual
Property Disputes, or How Cardtoons Got the Boot
I. Introduction
For a segment of the nation’s intellectual property (IP) practitioners, federal
law is in flux.  The availability of the declaratory judgment has long helped
owners of intellectual property rights, as well as their competitors, ascertain
their relative legal rights in complicated patent, trademark, and other IP
disputes—especially in cases when those rights might otherwise have been
unknown until the reading of a verdict revealing which party owed damages.
The Declaratory Judgment Act (the Act) enables federal courts to issue a
declaration of the parties’ rights in IP and other contexts,  but a plaintiff1
seeking declaratory relief must first clear a substantial hurdle by showing that
the dispute is justiciable.    Although the plaintiff bears the burden of proving2
the threshold requirement of an actual case or controversy in other federal
actions, the existence of a controversy can be harder to show in declaratory
judgment cases.   Declaratory litigants often seek a ruling before any actual3
damages have accrued, which can make their disputes seem premature or not
yet ripe for review.4
Whether an actual controversy exists is largely tied to the facts and
circumstances of each case, hindering the development of a bright-line rule to
determine federal jurisdiction.   Nonetheless, the courts have at times5
formulated tests that attempt to do just that.  The Federal Circuit developed
one such test for use in the context of challenges to the validity or applicability
of an intellectual property right.   The test required (1) that “the accused6
infringer must have actually produced or prepared to produce an allegedly
infringing product” and (2) that “the patent holder’s conduct must create an
objectively reasonable apprehension on the part of the accused infringer that
the patent holder will initiate suit if the allegedly infringing activity
continues.”   Widely applied by the Federal Circuit, this two-part test was7
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
358 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol.  62:357
8. 95 F.3d 959, 965-66 (10th Cir. 1996).
9. 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (“Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
issuance of a declaratory judgment.” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Maryland
Casualty, 312 U.S. at 273)).
10. As of November 20, 2009, Westlaw’s “Citing References” link for MedImmune, 549
U.S. 118, revealed at least eight decisions by the Federal Circuit, and approximately forty
decisions by district courts, applying the decision after lengthy examination.  
11. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
adopted by the Tenth Circuit in 1996 in Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League
Baseball Players Ass’n.   8
Over a decade later, the U.S. Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. considered and rejected this jurisdictional test, holding instead
that the amorphous factors usually analyzed by the federal courts to determine
the existence of an actual case or controversy must be examined in patent
disputes as well.   The Supreme Court’s reasoning was persuasive, and the9
2007 decision prompted federal courts nationwide to reassess their past
precedents.   The Tenth Circuit did so in the July 2008 Surefoot LC v. Sure10
Foot Corp. decision, following the Supreme Court’s directives and confidently
extending the MedImmune decision to a trademark-related declaratory
judgment action, something no other circuit court has done.   11
This note analyzes the Surefoot decision in a way that provides a primer for
IP litigators who practice in the Tenth Circuit.  Part II provides background
information about the Declaratory Judgment Act that, though far from
comprehensive, sets forth the necessary context for the rest of this note.  It
goes on to address the aspects of Cardtoons—the old law in the Tenth
Circuit—that must be understood in order to appreciate the recent changes.
Part III sets forth the current law governing federal jurisdiction over IP-related
declaratory judgment actions by analyzing the MedImmune and Surefoot
decisions.  Part IV follows by outlining the implications that this new case law
has for practitioners and parties to IP litigation in the Tenth Circuit.  The
MedImmune decision may have seemed of little relevance to all Tenth Circuit
litigators except the few who try patent cases; however, this note argues that
by applying MedImmune to a broader range of IP disputes, the Surefoot
decision made MedImmune and its progeny required reading for any
practitioner who may become involved in a nascent trademark, copyright, or
trade secrets dispute.  The note concludes in Part V.
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12. See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 514 (1868) (“Without jurisdiction the
court cannot proceed at all in any cause.  Jurisdiction is power to declare the law, and when it
ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact and
dismissing the cause.”).
13.  See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
14.  See id. (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State
and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the
same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”).
15. See 36 C.J.S. Federal Courts § 6 (2003).  
16. See id.  
17. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
18. See id. § 1331.
19. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006) (supplemental jurisdiction).
20. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94-95 (1968).
21. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006).
22. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239-40 (1937).
II. Background
A. Declaratory Judgments
In order to hear a case, a federal court must have jurisdiction over the
subject matter at issue.   The U.S. Constitution sets the outer limits of federal12
jurisdiction.   Article III, Section 2 provides for nine possible jurisdictional13
bases,  but these bases are not self-executing.   In other words, until Congress14 15
passes a statute that authorizes a federal court to hear a case that falls within
Article III, each jurisdictional basis represents only potential, not actual,
jurisdictional power.   Thus, unless a court has subject matter jurisdiction16
because of diversity of citizenship,  a federal question,  or another statutory17 18
basis,  it may not hear a case regardless of the type of relief sought.  19
Article III, Section 2 further dictates that the federal courts only hear actual
cases and controversies—truly adversarial disagreements capable of being
resolved by a court without the need to trespass on the territory of the other
two branches of government.   While the Declaratory Judgment Act’s20
language requires that parties be involved in “a case of actual controversy” for
jurisdiction to attach,  the Supreme Court has equated this standard to Article21
III’s case or controversy requirement.   22
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23. England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964) (“When a Federal
court is properly appealed to in a case over which it has by law jurisdiction, it is its duty to take
such jurisdiction . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Willcox v. Consol. Gas Co.,
212 U.S. 19, 40 (1909))).
24. See Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813-17
(1976).
25. Act of June 14, 1934, No. 343, ch. 512, 48 Stat. 955 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201).
26. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201; see also E.W. Bliss Co. v. Cold Metal Process Co., 156 F. Supp.
63, 67 (N.D. Ohio 1957) (holding that litigants have no more rights than before the passage of
the Act, but that the Act simply “introduced a new remedy”).
27. See Starter Corp. v. Converse, Inc., 84 F.3d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1996).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
29. See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Taylor, 118 F.R.D. 426, 429 (M.D.N.C. 1988).
30. See FED. R. CIV. P. 57.  For a thorough discussion of the Declaratory Judgment Act and
its relation to Rule 57, see 1 STEVEN S. GENSLER, FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE: RULES
AND COMMENTARY 857-65 (3d ed. 2009).
31. See, e.g., Beacon Constr. Co. v. Matco Elec. Co., 521 F.2d 392, 397 (2d Cir. 1975);
Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 729 (8th Cir. 1975).
32. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (“[A]ny court of the United States, upon the filing of an
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other legal relations of any interested party
seeking such declaration . . . .” (emphasis added)).
33. Duggins v. Hunt, 323 F.2d 746, 748 (10th Cir. 1963).
If a case meets these criteria, it is justiciable and may be brought before a
federal court.  In most instances, the court is bound to hear the case.   If a23
party seeks coercive relief, there are only specific and limited instances in
which a court may abstain from exercising its jurisdiction.  24
The Declaratory Judgment Act, enacted by Congress in 1934,  expanded25
the types of relief available to litigants in the federal courts.   While it did not26
(and could not) broaden the jurisdiction of the courts beyond the constitutional
limits,  the Act did allow courts to declare the legal rights of litigants involved27
in an actual dispute without the concomitant necessity of issuing a coercive
remedy like damages or an injunction.   Declaratory judgment actions allow28
a party to ascertain its legal position while putting less at risk by litigating
before coercive relief would be available.   The Federal Rules of Civil29
Procedure dictate the procedure for obtaining relief under the Act.   Courts30
have urged that the statute be construed liberally in order to give effect to the
Act’s aim of providing a quick and inexpensive means of determining legal
rights without imposing coercive remedies.   But while the Act allows the31
federal courts to hear cases before they reach a point where damages have
accrued, it does not obligate courts to hear every case in which a disagreement
or difference exists.32
Under the Act, Congress’s grant of authority to the federal courts “is not
one of compulsion.”   Rather, the power to hear declaratory judgment cases33
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34. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
35. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Mhoon, 31 F.3d 979, 983 (10th Cir. 1994) (quoting
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Green, 825 F.2d 1061, 1063 (6th Cir. 1987)).
36. Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995) (citing Brillhart v. Excess Ins.
Co. of Am., 316 U.S. 491 (1942)).
37. See Shannon v. Sequeechi, 365 F.2d 827, 829 (10th Cir. 1966).  No parallel state court
action was pending in Surefoot.  See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir.
2008).  
38. See, e.g., E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 521-22 (1998) (declaring rights under the
Takings Clause of the U.S. Constitution).
39. See, e.g., Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Jones, 570 F.2d 1384, 1386 (10th Cir. 1978)
(declaring liability under an automobile insurance policy). 
40. See, e.g., Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338-39 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (discussing instances when a pre-infringement patent dispute does and does not present
is discretionary, meaning that it is left to the district court’s good judgment.34
The Tenth Circuit directs trial judges to consider five factors in determining
whether to hear a declaratory action: 
[1] whether a declaratory action would settle the controversy; [2]
whether it would serve a useful purpose in clarifying the legal
relations at issue; [3] whether the declaratory remedy is being used
merely for the purpose of “procedural fencing” or “to provide an
arena for a race to res judicata”; [4] whether use of a declaratory
action would increase friction between our federal and state courts
and improperly encroach upon state jurisdiction; and [5] whether
there is an alternative remedy which is better or more effective.35
Although the Supreme Court has not announced specific criteria for exercising
Declaratory Judgment Act discretion at the trial level, it has concluded that
abuse of discretion is the proper appellate standard of review for a trial court’s
decision, at least when a parallel state court proceeding is ongoing.   The36
Tenth Circuit reviews district court decisions for abuse of discretion regardless
of whether a state case is pending.37
Declaratory judgments can be useful to litigants in a number of contexts.
For example, a property owner who obtains a declaration of the
constitutionality of a proposed government taking can ascertain whether the
property may be seized and further invest in or hypothecate the property with
this knowledge.   An insurer questioning the validity of a claim can try the38
facts before a judge in order to decide whether to pay, without first being sued
by the insured.   Likewise, questions involving intellectual property rights are39
often well suited to resolution through a declaratory judgment action.  There
are a number of situations in which a dispute exists over a patent or trademark,
but an injury may not yet have occurred.   For example, suppose a company40
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a case or controversy under Article III).  The Prasco court found no injury—and no case or
controversy—where the declaratory plaintiff claimed to be “paralyzed” by fear of an
infringement suit, yet the patent holder had taken no affirmative actions indicating
contemplation of a lawsuit.  See id. at 1238, 1241-42. 
41. 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). 
42. Id. at 962.
43. Id. at 962-63.
44. Id. at 962.
45. Id. at 963-64.
46. Id. at 963.  
47. Id. at 964.
is prepared to sell a product that a trademark owner claims violates his mark.
While the owner of the trademark suffers no damages until the product is
actually sold, the competing manufacturer may want to determine the mark’s
applicability to his product before exposing himself to liability.  This scenario
lends itself to a declaratory judgment, but raises the question whether there is
an actual controversy necessary for federal jurisdiction to attach. 
B. The Former Tenth Circuit Jurisdictional Standard: Cardtoons, L.C. v.
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n 
1. Facts
Jurisdiction was the issue in 1996 when the Tenth Circuit decided
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n.   Cardtoons41
developed a set of novelty baseball cards that featured lightly disguised
caricatures of Major League Baseball (MLB) players.   The cards parodied42
different aspects of the players’ on- and off-field personalities, featured
“statistics” such as how much money the players earned, and made comments
about their vanity.   The cards were humorous in nature and explicitly43
disavowed any permission or license from MLB; however, the players and
teams featured would have been easily recognizable to baseball fans.   After44
the designs had been set and a manufacturer had been chosen, but before the
cards were actually printed, the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) sent cease and desist letters to Cardtoons and its manufacturer
alleging publicity rights infringement.   The MLBPA acted on behalf of MLB45
players and exercised their publicity rights, granting or denying permission to
use the players’ names and images in connection with various products,
particularly baseball cards.   Cardtoons believed that its product was a46
permissible parody that did not infringe on the players’ publicity rights and
sought a declaratory judgment in federal district court.  47
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol62/iss2/5
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48. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 838 F. Supp. 1501, 1504
(N.D. Okla. 1993).
49. See Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n, 868 F. Supp. 1266, 1275-
76 (N.D. Okla. 1994).
50. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 965.  
51. Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
52. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 965-66 (citing Spectronics Corp. v. H.B. Fuller Co., 940 F.2d
631, 634 (Fed. Cir. 1991)).
53. Id. at 966.
54. Id. 
55. Id. at 976.
56. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
The trial court struggled to find the appropriate jurisdictional test and first
ruled for the MLBPA.   The same court subsequently set aside that decision,48
holding instead that the parody did not violate the players’ publicity rights and
granting a declaratory judgment in favor of Cardtoons.   49
2. The Adoption of the “Reasonable Apprehension” Test
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the MLBPA argued that the dispute was not
a case or controversy capable of being heard by the district court.   The50
Supreme Court had long maintained that the Declaratory Judgment Act
required a highly fact-specific inquiry to establish Article III standing and that
“it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion a precise test for
determining in every case whether there is such a controversy.”   The Tenth51
Circuit nonetheless borrowed the test from the Federal Circuit that found an
actual controversy within the meaning of Article III in intellectual property
disputes when “(1) the declaratory plaintiff has produced or is prepared to
produce the product in question and (2) the declaratory defendant’s conduct
has created a reasonable apprehension on the part of the declaratory plaintiff
that it will face suit if it commences or continues the activity at issue.”52
Applying this test to the facts, the Tenth Circuit held that Cardtoons satisfied
the first element because the cards were fully designed and ready to be
printed.   The second element was satisfied by the MLBPA cease and desist53
letters that threatened to use full legal remedies to prevent the cards’
production.  The court found the letters especially significant considering that
the MLBPA had actually sued baseball card manufacturers in the past under
similar circumstances.   Turning to the merits, the court affirmed the holding54
for Cardtoons, finding that the company’s First Amendment rights outweighed
the baseball players’ interests in the use of their identities.55
The “reasonable apprehension” test adopted in Cardtoons guided district
courts in the Tenth Circuit until Surefoot twelve years later.   The first prong56
focused on the actions of the potential infringer, who must at least have been
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2010
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57. Cardtoons, 95 F.3d at 965.
58. Id. at 965-66.
59. See, e.g., MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated,
549 U.S. 1163 (2007).
60. See id. at 1379 (“When a potential infringer seeks declaratory relief in the absence of
a lawsuit by the patentee, there must be both (1) a reasonable apprehension on the part of the
declaratory judgment plaintiff that it will face an infringement suit; and (2) present activity by
the declaratory judgment plaintiff which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken
with the intent to conduct such activity.”); see also Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 395
F.3d 1324, 1333 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (requiring “reasonable apprehension of imminent suit”).
61. 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
62. See 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (authorizing courts to increase actual damages by as much
as three times upon a finding of patent infringement); see also Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro,
Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1352 n.16 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (supplying nine factors to help determine
whether enhancement of damages for patent infringement is appropriate).
prepared to produce the disputed product.   The second prong required action57
on the part of the owner of the intellectual property right sufficient to create
a reasonable apprehension of litigation in the mind of the potential infringer.58
Although the Tenth Circuit had no other occasion to apply this test until
Surefoot, the Federal Circuit had several opportunities to refine its test as it
considered various factual scenarios that did or did not pass the test.   The test59
remained a two-part analysis with language substantially similar to that used
in Cardtoons.60
III. A New Jurisdictional Standard
A. MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc.
1. Facts and Procedural History
A common scenario to which the “reasonable apprehension” test
applied—and the one ultimately ruled on in MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc.—involved a licensee of a patent who disputed the legitimacy of the patent
or its application to the licensee’s own product, yet continued to pay licensing
fees for fear of infringement damages.   The possibility of a treble damages61
assessment for willful infringement in such a situation made breaking a
licensing agreement a particularly risky move.   Declaratory relief would have62
been ideal for a licensee in this position because the extent of the patent’s
validity was the missing piece of information.  But under these circumstances,
it was unclear whether a licensee who continued to faithfully pay its fees could
have been said to either (1) have a reasonable apprehension of an infringement
suit, or (2) have the intent to conduct an infringing activity, as required by the
two-prong test.  
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63. See, e.g., Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
64. See id.
65. See, e.g., Seroctin Research & Techs., Inc. v. Unigen Pharm., Inc., 541 F. Supp. 2d
1238, 1242 (D. Utah 2008) (addressing a patent holder’s claims for infringement, Lanham Act
violations, unfair competition, and breach of contract, all triggered by a licensee’s failure to pay
royalties).  
66. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 121.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. at 121-22.
70. Id. at 122.
71. Id.
72. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., No. CV 03-2567 MRP(CTX), 2004 WL
3770589, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 26, 2004).
Until MedImmune, the Federal Circuit maintained the position that a
licensee who had not breached its licensing agreement did not present a case
or controversy regarding the validity or applicability of the patent because
there was nothing that would create a reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit
from its licensor, the patent owner.   This interpretation precluded many63
patent, trademark, and other intellectual property right licensees from being
able to test the necessity of their licensing payments through a declaratory
judgment action.  Only by breaking its licensing contract would a licensee put
itself in a position to reasonably fear an infringement suit.   But, by taking64
such an action, the licensee would simultaneously open itself to a host of legal
claims like patent infringement and breach of contract.65
In MedImmune, the petitioner faced a similar predicament.  MedImmune
manufactured a drug, Synagis, which was used to prevent respiratory tract
disease in children.   Genentech, the respondent, originally held one patent66
related to the drug and had an application pending on another patent, the rights
to both of which it licensed to MedImmune in exchange for royalty
payments.   Once the outstanding application matured into a patent,67
Genentech sought to collect the royalties associated with it according to the
terms of the licensing agreement.   MedImmune viewed the new patent as68
invalid and unenforceable, and denied that Synagis would infringe on that
patent even if it were enforceable.   Nonetheless, MedImmune did not want69
to withhold royalties because of the danger that a suit by Genentech could
bring about treble damages and an injunction on the sale of Synagis.70
MedImmune instead paid the royalties under protest and immediately sought
declaratory relief in federal court under the Declaratory Judgment Act.  71
At the district court level, Genentech moved to dismiss the claims under the
holding of Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc.,  the Federal Circuit’s most recent72
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73. See Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
74. MedImmune, 2004 WL 3770589, at *6.
75. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 427 F.3d 958, 963-64, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
76. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132 n.11.
77. Id. at 128-29.  The first case mentioned by the Court, Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S.
197 (1923), involved a state law prohibiting the lease of land to an alien.  The second, Steffel
v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), involved a state law prohibiting the distribution of handbills.
78. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 129.
79. See id. at 130.
80. Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359, 365 (1943).
81. Id. at 363.
82. Id. at 365.
iteration of the “reasonable apprehension” test.   Because of MedImmune’s73
decision to pay the royalties as demanded, the court held that MedImmune
presented no case or controversy as defined by the Gen-Probe test and
dismissed the request for declaratory relief.   The Federal Circuit affirmed the74
dismissal, also relying on Gen-Probe.  75
2. The MedImmune Decision: Abrogation of the “Reasonable
Apprehension” Test
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court for the first time considered the
propriety of the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable apprehension” test.   The Court76
first analogized the parties’ situation to past cases where the government
threatened to enforce laws criminalizing actions that declaratory plaintiffs were
considering taking.   In these situations, the Court wrote, there was no77
requirement that the plaintiffs first take the illegal actions before challenging
the constitutionality of the laws threatened to be enforced.   78
In the case of two private parties, the Court found its precedent of Altvater
v. Freeman to be on point.   There, a patent licensee was paying injunction-79
imposed royalties to a patent holder under protest when the patent holder
sued.   In a counterclaim, the licensee sought a declaration that the patent was80
invalid.   The Court in Altvater found an actual case or controversy, holding81
that the licensee’s continued payment of royalties was in effect coerced and
thus did not preclude federal jurisdiction.  The Court stated,
[T]he requirements of [a] case or controversy are met where
payment of a claim is demanded as of right and where payment is
made, but where the involuntary or coercive nature of the exaction
preserves the right to recover the sums paid or to challenge the
legality of the claim.82
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83. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381-82 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
84. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 132.
85. Id. at 132 n.11.
86. Id.  The Court cited Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270
(1941) (finding a justiciable controversy between plaintiff-insurer and defendant-collision
victim, despite the fact that the collision victim was precluded by law from suing the insurer
unless and until the victim received a judgment against the insured, a third party to the
declaratory judgment action); Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937)
(finding a justiciable controversy despite lack of any threat from declaratory defendant to sue
plaintiff-insurer); and Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc., 508 U.S. 83 (1993)
(finding that a noninfringement determination in favor of a declaratory defendant-turned-
counterclaimant did not necessarily moot the question of patent validity).
87. MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 134. 
88. Id. at 137.  Importantly, the Court did not signal any change to the discretionary aspect
of Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction and left up to the district court the final decision of
whether to hear the merits of the action.  Id. at 136. 
The Gen-Probe court had distinguished Altvater because in Altvater an
injunction compelled the licensee to continue royalty payments.   The83
MedImmune Court rejected this distinction, finding that the coercion at issue
in Altvater was not imposed by the injunction; rather, it was caused by the
looming possibility of an infringement suit by the patent holder and an award
of treble damages.   Thus, one of the Court’s few precedents on point84
suggested that MedImmune did not have to breach its licensing agreement in
order to establish jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.
The Court directly addressed the Federal Circuit’s two-part “reasonable
apprehension” test—a parallel to the Tenth Circuit’s Cardtoons standard—in
a footnote.   The Court noted that the test conflicted with several of its own85
precedential cases, which found jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment
Act despite a lack of reasonable apprehension of a lawsuit.   After86
disapproving of the jurisdictional test, the Court explicitly overturned the
lower courts’ application of that test to the dispute before it: “The rule that a
plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the farm, or (as here) risk treble
damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business, before seeking a declaration
of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article III.”   Thus,87
the Court held that MedImmune did not have to break its licensing agreement
in order to establish a case or controversy under Article III, reversed the
dismissal, and remanded the case to the court of appeals.   In rejecting the88
notion that such a fact-specific determination as justiciability could be reduced
to a bright-line rule, the Court refocused the inquiry as one based on the
totality of the circumstances: “Basically, the question in each case is whether
the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
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91. See id. at 1381 (“[W]here a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
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the right to engage in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will
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before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.”).
92. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2007).
93. This figure was determined using Westlaw’s “Citing References” link for MedImmune,
549 U.S. 118.
94. See, e.g., Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Caraco
Pharm. Labs., Ltd. v. Forest Labs., Inc., 527 F.3d 1278 (Fed. Cir. 2008); Micron Tech., Inc. v.
Mosaid Techs., Inc., 518 F.3d 897 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
95. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2008).
96. In order to “provide nationwide uniformity in patent law,” Bonito Boats, Inc. v.
Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 162 (1989) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 97-312, at 20
(1981)), the Federal Circuit exercises exclusive jurisdiction over patent appeals, 28 U.S.C. §
1295 (2006).  Thus, the Tenth Circuit may hear only intellectual property appeals involving
other types of intellectual property.  
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”89
B. The Federal Circuit Reacts to MedImmune
Reaction to MedImmune from the Federal Circuit was immediate.  Within
three months, the court accepted that MedImmune abrogated at least the first
prong of the “reasonable apprehension” test.   Rather than splitting hairs over90
the applicability of MedImmune, the court wholeheartedly adopted the idea
that something less than the threat of a lawsuit may properly create an actual
controversy in the context of patent disputes.   Only days later, the Federal91
Circuit completely abandoned its two-prong test as having been overruled.92
As of November 20, 2009, the Federal Circuit had favorably applied the
holding in MedImmune at least twenty-two times,  leaving little doubt about93
the death of the “reasonable apprehension” test.   None of the other federal94
courts of appeals, however, had the opportunity to apply the Supreme Court’s
ruling until the Tenth Circuit heard Surefoot.95
C. The Tenth Circuit Weighs In: Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp.
Intellectual property cases invoking the Declaratory Judgment Act are heard
relatively rarely by the Tenth Circuit,  so it is little surprise that the court did96
not have an immediate opportunity to weigh in with its own application of
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HT Window Fashions Corp., 514 F. Supp. 2d 753, 760 (W.D. Pa. 2007).
99. 531 F.3d 1236.
100. Id. at 1238.
101. Id.
102. See Due North by Sure Foot Corporation, The Company http://www.surefoot.net/
company.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2009).  The company’s core business is the manufacture and
sale of rubber devices equipped with carbide spikes that slip over a customer’s shoe soles to
provide traction in snow and ice.  Id. 
103. Surefoot, 531 F.3d at 1238.
104. See Surefoot, The World’s Most Comfortable Ski Boot, http://www.Surefoot.com/
index.php (last visited Nov. 20, 2009) (follow the “About Surefoot” and “Find a store”
hyperlinks, respectively). 
105. Surefoot, 531 F.3d at 1238.
MedImmune.   In fact, it took eighteen months for the Tenth Circuit to97
consider MedImmune, and by that time the Supreme Court’s holding had been
tested several times by the Federal Circuit.   Notably, however, all of the98
Federal Circuit cases involved disputes between patent holders and their
competitors.  These cases went a long way toward defining the kinds of fact
patterns in patent law that present a case or controversy, but did little to flesh
out what MedImmune meant to disputes over other types of intellectual
property.  In Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp.,  the Tenth Circuit added99
significantly to the discussion with the first appellate application of
MedImmune to a declaratory judgment action featuring a trademark dispute.
1. Facts
As the case name suggests, Surefoot involved a dispute between two
companies with similar names that both did business in the footwear
industry.   The first party to set up shop was Sure Foot Corporation (Sure100
Foot N.D.),  a North Dakota-based manufacturer of shoe components such101
as traction products, laces, and insoles.   The company registered the “Sure102
Foot” trademark in 1985 for its shoe traction pads.   The more recently103
established litigant was Surefoot LC (Surefoot Utah), a Park City, Utah,
manufacturer of custom-fit ski boots with retail outlets in twenty-five cities
around the world.   Surefoot Utah had been doing business since 1994.  104 105
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114. Id.  The various filings before the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board were consolidated
into a single proceeding, which remained pending at the time of suit.  Id.
115. Id.; see also Surefoot L.C. v. Sure Foot Corp., No. 2:06-CV-554 TS, 2006 WL
3196762, at *1 (D. Utah Nov. 2, 2006).
In 1998, Sure Foot N.D. made its first charge that Surefoot Utah was
infringing on its established trademark.   In a cease and desist letter written106
to the Utah company, Sure Foot N.D. claimed that the similar names created
a likelihood of confusion in the industry and demanded that Surefoot Utah
discontinue its use of “Surefoot” in connection with its business.   During the107
next year, the two companies disputed the implications of their similar names:
Surefoot Utah maintained that the companies’ product lines were distinct
enough to preclude consumer confusion, while Sure Foot N.D. countered that
confusion in the market was already a reality.   Sure Foot N.D. claimed that108
litigation was not its desire but threatened a lawsuit several times as a fallback
position, while Surefoot Utah remained steadfast in refusing to change its
name and offered to contemplate a monetary settlement instead.109
The lead-up to the lawsuit began in September 2000 when Surefoot Utah
applied to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) to register the
“Surefoot” mark for the first time.   By June 2002, Sure Foot N.D. had not110
expressed any opposition to the trademark application, even though the
USPTO had posted a Notice of Publication for the application a year earlier.111
Accordingly, the USPTO issued a trademark registration.   Only afterward,112
in August 2002, did Sure Foot N.D. petition the USPTO’s Trademark Trial
and Appeal Board, requesting cancellation of the “Surefoot” mark.   The113
process continued with Surefoot Utah applying to register the “Surefoot” mark
in conjunction with several other products and Sure Foot N.D. filing
oppositions to every application.   Surefoot Utah feared that, in addition to114
opposing its trademark registrations, Sure Foot N.D. would sue for trademark
infringement, so the ski boot manufacturer launched a preemptive strike in




116. Surefoot, 2006 WL 3196762, at *1.
117. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
118. See discussion supra Part II.B.2.
119. Surefoot, 2006 WL 3196762, at *1. 
120. Id. at *4.  The court applied a formulation of the test articulated in Menashe v. Secret
Catalogue, Inc., 409 F. Supp. 2d 412, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2006):  
The test for an actual case or controversy in trademark actions is two pronged: (i)
has the defendant’s conduct created a real and reasonable apprehension of liability
on the part of the plaintiff; and (ii) has the plaintiff engaged in a course of conduct
which has brought it into adversarial conflict with the defendant.
See Surefoot, 2006 WL 3196762, at *1 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
121. Surefoot, 2006 WL 3196762, at *4.  
122. See Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1239 (10th Cir. 2008).
123. See id.  
2. The District Court Action
In the district court, Surefoot Utah sought declarations that (1) Surefoot
Utah had not infringed on the “Sure Foot” trademark; (2) the “Sure Foot”
trademark was invalid or limited; and (3) equitable principles precluded any
claims by Sure Foot N.D. for trademark infringement, unfair competition, or
dilution.   Significantly, the 2006 lawsuit came before the MedImmune116
decision;  therefore, the two-prong “reasonable apprehension” test was still117
the widely recognized standard by which declaratory judgment jurisdiction
was decided.   Accordingly, Sure Foot N.D. responded by moving to dismiss118
for want of jurisdiction owing to a lack of an actual case or controversy.119
The district court applied a test substantively equivalent to the Cardtoons
standard and found that Sure Foot N.D.’s seven-year-old litigation threats,
coupled with its opposition to Surefoot Utah’s trademark applications, were
not enough to put Surefoot Utah in “real and reasonable apprehension of
suit.”   The district court therefore granted Sure Foot N.D.’s motion to120
dismiss.121
3. The Tenth Circuit Appeal: Cardtoons Abrogated
For Surefoot Utah, the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune came at
an opportune time.  The ski boot manufacturer repeatedly denied having
violated any of Sure Foot N.D.’s rights, and the dispute over the trademarks
had smoldered for nearly ten years.   Surefoot Utah must have felt that it was122
embroiled in an actual controversy, yet the characteristics of the dispute
evidently stopped just short of what would have caused the company to
reasonably fear being sued.   Under the law that the district court was obliged123
to apply in the motion to dismiss, this was fatal to Surefoot Utah’s case.  But
when the Supreme Court rejected the “reasonable apprehension” requirement
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only two months later,  the figurative doors to federal court reopened for124
Surefoot Utah.  Thus, Surefoot Utah appealed to the Tenth Circuit seeking
review of the district court’s decision in light of MedImmune.
The Tenth Circuit began the Surefoot opinion by recounting the
MedImmune decision in general terms.   Acknowledging MedImmune as125
controlling law, the court then focused on the implications of the decision on
Cardtoons, recognizing the abrogation of the test used in that case.126
Ultimately, the Tenth Circuit embraced the Supreme Court’s reasoning in
MedImmune:
[T]o the extent that the Declaratory Judgment Act’s “case of actual
controversy” formulation was intended to reference Article III’s
case-or-controversy requirement, discarding the reasonable
apprehension of suit test makes good sense: the existence of an
Article III case or controversy has never been decided by a judicial
wager on the chances the parties will (imminently or otherwise) sue
one another; rather, it has always focused on the underlying facts,
assessing whether they suggest an extant controversy between the
parties or whether instead they merely call on us to supply an
advisory opinion about a hypothetical dispute.127
The court then turned to Sure Foot N.D.’s arguments that MedImmune
should not control in the present case.   The court first disagreed with Sure128
Foot N.D.’s contention that the MedImmune Court’s disapproval of the
“reasonable apprehension” test was a footnoted dictum that did not require
adherence.   In addition to concurring with the Supreme Court’s reasoning129
for disapproving of the test, the Tenth Circuit underscored that it was not at
liberty to cherry-pick among clear directives from the Supreme Court,
following some but not others “as if ordering from a menu.”   Thus, the130
Tenth Circuit not only recognized the invalidity of the “reasonable
apprehension” prong,  but also proceeded to retire the second requirement of131
the Cardtoons test—that the declaratory plaintiff has produced or is prepared
to produce the disputed product.   By doing so, the Tenth Circuit officially132
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abrogated the Cardtoons test in favor of the more liberal MedImmune standard,
which asks only whether a substantial controversy exists considering the
totality of the circumstances.133
Second, despite Sure Foot N.D.’s urging, the Tenth Circuit had no problem
applying MedImmune, a patent case, to the trademark dispute before the
court.   Significantly, the court implied that the Supreme Court’s ruling134
would likely apply with equal force to a dispute over any intellectual property
right.135
Finally, the court acknowledged that in the dispute before it, unlike that in
MedImmune, the two parties did not have a privity relationship through a
licensing agreement or other contract.   Again, the Tenth Circuit focused on136
the Supreme Court’s reasoning rather than the specific facts and interpreted
MedImmune as directing generally that litigants need not go so far as to subject
themselves to liability before they may receive a declaration of their rights.137
This maxim, the court reasoned, applies with equal force to situations where
no contract exists between the parties.138
IV. Surefoot’s Implications for Tenth Circuit Attorneys and Litigants
Through its decision in Surefoot, the court in some ways confirmed what
most already knew to be true after MedImmune, but also sent Tenth Circuit
intellectual property law in some unexpected directions.  It is now beyond
dispute, in the Tenth Circuit and all others, that courts no longer apply the
“reasonable apprehension” test to determine if jurisdiction is proper in at least
some types of IP disputes invoking the Declaratory Judgment Act.   Instead,139
a claimant must show a concrete and substantial controversy capable of being
resolved through a declaration of rights.   Only in the Tenth Circuit, however,140
is there now an explicit indication that this new standard may apply to all types
of IP disputes, and only in the Tenth Circuit is it “on the books” that no privity
of contract is required between parties to such an action.   After Surefoot,141
district courts in the Tenth Circuit have the option to hear a range of disputes
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that were barred before and that may still be considered nonjusticiable by the
other circuits.
A. Extending the Bounds of MedImmune
Practitioners in the Tenth Circuit can be confident that intellectual property
disputes of all kinds, not just those involving patents, have the potential to
pose an actual case or controversy even in the absence of a threat of a
lawsuit.   The Surefoot decision provides a ready example of how a142
trademark dispute may fulfill all the criteria set forth by the Supreme Court,
even though the Court’s opinion in MedImmune focused only on claims
involving a patent.   The Tenth Circuit recognized that the Supreme Court’s143
reasoning can probably be applied to a dispute over any intellectual property
right, so long as there is a concrete controversy as defined by the Supreme
Court.   While litigants in other circuits are assured only that MedImmune144
will apply when patents are at issue, litigants in the Tenth Circuit know that it
can apply to everything from patents and trademarks to publicity rights and
trade secrets.
That the Tenth Circuit has given such wide latitude to the district courts is
particularly significant because of the infrequency with which it hears IP-
related Declaratory Judgment Act cases.   Unlike the Federal Circuit, which145
hears all appeals of patent-related declaratory judgment cases,  the Tenth146
Circuit had not decided a single IP-related declaratory judgment case based on
Cardtoons in the dozen years between Cardtoons and Surefoot.   Any ironing147
that needs to be done to wrinkles in the Surefoot decision will likely be done
at the district court level, without quick intervention from the Tenth Circuit.
Because Surefoot opens the door to district court judges in the Tenth Circuit
to consider any IP dispute under the MedImmune-Surefoot framework,  trial148
courts are likely to construe the case broadly.
The Tenth Circuit further illuminated the decision in MedImmune by
proclaiming that an IP rights dispute may present an actual case or controversy
even if the parties are not in a contractual relationship with each other.149
There has never been a per se requirement in the Tenth Circuit that privity of
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151. MedImmune, Inc. v. Centocor, Inc., 409 F.3d 1376, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2005), vacated, 549
U.S. 1163 (2007).
152. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 134-36 (2007).
153. See Carbice Corp. of Am. v. Am. Patents Dev. Corp., 283 U.S. 27, 33 (1931)
(recognizing the tort of patent infringement by parties not in privity with the patent holder);
Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Recovery Based on Tortfeasor’s Profits in Action for Procuring
Breach of Contract, 5 A.L.R. 4th 1276, § 1 (1981) (discussing breach of a licensing agreement
as an action on the contract).
154. See Surefoot, 531 F.3d at 1243.
155. Id.
contract exist,  and in the pre-MedImmune Federal Circuit, the failure of a150
declaratory plaintiff to materially breach its licensing agreement precluded the
court from finding an actual case or controversy between the parties.   The151
Supreme Court then specifically held that a licensee can present a case or
controversy despite being in privity with the patent holder, but left open the
question whether its decision applied equally to parties not in privity with one
another.   152
The Tenth Circuit’s holding that no privity of contract is necessary provides
parity in the causes of action available to a declaratory plaintiff (the alleged
infringer) and a plaintiff seeking coercive relief (the trademark or patent
holder).  When a trademark holder is in privity of contract with a licensee, it
may sue for breach of contract; if there is no contract between the two parties,
the trademark owner may still sue for the tort of trademark infringement.153
The position urged by Sure Foot N.D., and rejected by the Tenth Circuit,
would have foreclosed a true tort action by a declaratory plaintiff and left a
contract action as the only means of opening the door to declaratory relief.154
The Surefoot decision leaves no doubt that the trademark holder can sue and
be sued under both contract and tort theories.   While a dispute in connection155
with a preexisting licensing agreement will likely remain the scenario that
most often invokes Declaratory Judgment Act jurisdiction, an IP right cannot
be immunized from challenge in the Tenth Circuit based solely on the owner’s
decision to license or not license its use.
B. Limitations on the Decision
Surefoot unquestionably expanded the realm of possibilities for a district
court presented with an IP dispute under the Declaratory Judgment Act, but the
breadth of the decision should not be overstated for several reasons.  First, by
allowing an intellectual property owner to be sued by a competitor that does
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not hold a license to use the property, the Tenth Circuit went beyond the
Supreme Court’s explicit MedImmune holding; however, the Surefoot court
did not go so far as to leave IP owners vulnerable to a declaratory judgment
action from anyone.  Although the litigants in Surefoot did not have a
contractual relationship, they did have a history of legal wrangling over
trademark rights,  and, importantly to the circuit court, Sure Foot N.D. filed156
five Trademark Trial and Appeal Board oppositions to Surefoot Utah’s
trademark applications.   The Tenth Circuit opinion made clear that only this157
combination could guarantee the existence of an actual controversy and that
jurisdiction might not attach when there are fewer contacts between the
parties.158
Second, Surefoot is unlikely to affect the way the Declaratory Judgment Act
is applied in other areas, like insurance law.  Both the Supreme Court and the
Tenth Circuit cited insurance cases in their IP opinions.   Nevertheless, the159
use of these cases in both instances merely illustrated the holding announced
and therefore did not represent an attempt to address insurance law out of
context.  In MedImmune, the Court cited two insurance precedents to illustrate
that it had never followed the “reasonable apprehension” test.   Thus, the160
insurance cases were used to inform the discussion of the patent dispute, not
the other way around.  The Tenth Circuit cited the same Supreme Court
insurance cases as examples of how the MedImmune decision should apply in
contexts other than patent disputes.   Here, too, the court never suggested that161
these precedential decisions be reexamined; rather, it used them as a model to
extend MedImmune farther in the context of intellectual property disputes.  In
short, Surefoot brought jurisdictional standards for IP-related declaratory
judgment litigation in line with the standards for insurance-related litigation
but did not change the way courts should treat jurisdiction in insurance
disputes.
Finally, the abrogation of the strict jurisdictional test from Cardtoons is
unlikely to bring a wave of new lawsuits into the district courts in the Tenth
Circuit.  Two factors suggest that a sharp rise in IP-related actions seeking
declaratory relief will not occur.  First, such suits are naturally uncommon in
this circuit.   In the twelve-year span between Cardtoons and Surefoot,162
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district courts in the Tenth Circuit cited the Cardtoons decision less than
twenty times,  and only two of those citations appeared in cases involving IP-163
related declaratory judgment claims.   The arguably looser jurisdictional164
requirements may open the door to a few cases that were not able to pass the
old Cardtoons standard, but the fact remains that the federal courts in the
Tenth Circuit are not regularly called on to decide these types of cases.  In
addition, the Tenth Circuit left intact the broad discretion that trial courts
possess to choose which Declaratory Judgment Act cases they will hear.165
This nearly unfettered discretion enjoyed by district court judges should serve
as a backstop to catch cases that do not properly belong in federal court.
V. Conclusion
Surefoot is new law, yet it has already been cited nine times by district
courts in the Tenth Circuit as of November 20, 2009.   The Tenth Circuit166
Court of Appeals has also cited its Surefoot decision twice in the same period,
although neither case involved an IP-related declaratory judgment.   Until167
courts in the Tenth Circuit fully define the boundaries of Surefoot, however,
those involved in IP litigation in the Tenth Circuit can expect to continue
looking to Federal Circuit case law when necessary to fill in the gaps—at least
one pre-MedImmune practice that is unlikely to get the boot any time soon.
John M. Bunting
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